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Abstract 
The major aim of the present research programme was to investigate the theoretical 
framework of working memory as it relates to the control of attention in sport 
because attention research in sport has been criticized for lacking a suitable 
theoretical framework (Bocher, 2008). Chapter 2 introduces the concept of working 
memory in combination with dual-process theories of cognitive control (Kahneman, 
2011) and establishes how these two bodies of literature can be combined to form a 
guiding theory for attention research in sport. In Chapter 3 a central mechanism is 
highlighted how working memory is involved in the control of attention in sport. 
Seven experiments demonstrate that the activated contents—visual objects and 
verbal instructions—in working memory control the focus of attention in sport 
decision making situations. Chapter IV reviews literature showing that working 
memory capacity is an important individual difference variable that is predictive of 
controlling attention in a goal-directed manner and avoiding distraction and 
interference. Two experiments demonstrate that athletes with a high working 
memory capacity are more successful at staying focused, avoiding distraction, and 
impulsive errors in specific sport situations. Chapter V discusses whether differences 
in working memory capacity as they related to the control of attention contribute to 
sport expertise. The conducted studies do not indicate that working memory capacity 
contributes to sport expertise as high level athletes did not differ to both low level 
athletes and non-athletes on this basic capacity. Chapter VI specifies how the 
research program has broadened and extended the sports attention and expertise 
literature, having both theoretical and practical implications, and offering some 
promising avenues for future investigations.   
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Beside the multifaceted challenges the Olympic athletes were confronted with 
in their respective sports during London’s 2012 Olympic Games, England’s capital 
posed an additional “challenge” not only to the athletes but also to the millions of 
visiting spectators from all over the world. At first sight the “challenge” I am 
referring to has nothing to do with sports but is suitable for introducing the 
overarching theme of this cumulative thesis. The “challenge” I have in mind is 
caused by the fact that people in Great Britain drive on the left side of the road 
instead of the right side as in most other nations. This not only makes driving in 
London for people from right-hand traffic countries a real challenge compared to the 
effortless habit of driving in their home country but also the simple everyday routine 
of crossing the road suddenly becomes a problem that requires careful attention.  
People who grew up in right-hand traffic countries have become accustomed 
to first orient their gaze and attention to the left before they cross the road because 
this is where the important information of approaching cars is expected. In the course 
of time this looking behavior becomes automated and therefore requires less and less 
controlled attention. In this manner people become well “equipped” for crossing the 
road in right-hand traffic countries as they adapt to the constraints imposed upon 
them in their home environments. Unfortunately, these people are less well 
“equipped” to cross the road when visiting London for the 2012 Olympics and 
therefore special instructions were installed at road crossings telling people to first 
look to the right to override their automatic tendency of orienting their attention to 
the left.  
The conducted studies outlined in this synopsis are not about crossing the 
road and this anecdotal example does not have anything to do with Olympic sports or 
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sports in general but it is highly suitable to introduce the main topic that the studies 
reviewed in this synopsis have in common: the control of attention in sports. 
Aims of the Thesis 
Although researchers have acknowledged the importance of attention in sport 
(Abernethey, 2001; Memmert, 2009; Moran, 1996; Wulf, 2007) research in this area 
is underdeveloped and has been conducted in a piecemeal fashion without a suitable 
overarching theoretical framework: “a suitable framework to study the influence of 
attention on sport skills has not been established” (Boucher, 2008, p. 326). This 
paradigm-specific research has recently been criticized (Meiser, 2011) as providing 
only limited insight into the function of attention in everyday behavior (Kingston, 
Smilek, Ristic, Friesen, & Eastwood, 2003). 
In the present thesis I attempt to address this shortcoming by building on 
recent progress in cognitive psychology suggesting that the theoretical framework of 
Working Memory (WM, Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) is highly useful for studying 
attention in complex everyday behavior (Baddeley, 2007, Conway, Jarrold, Kane, 
Miyake, & Towse, 2007, Cowan, 2005, Miyake & Shah, 1999) such as sport. By 
adopting dual-process theories (Kahneman, 2011; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) as a 
theoretical starting point I attempt to highlight a general mechanism of how WM 
controls attention before I systematically investigate individual difference variables 
to further illuminate the relationship of WM and attentional control in sport and 
specifically in the development of sport expertise. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework and Outline of the Synopsis  
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Dual Process Theories as a Theoretical Starting Point 
On a very general level numerous psychological theories agree that human 
behavior is controlled by two qualitatively different modes of processing, automatic 
and controlled processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977): dual-process theories of 
social cognition (Smith & DeCoester, 2000), person perception (e.g Gilbert, 1989; 
Zárate, Sanders, & Garza, 2000), judgment & reasoning (De Neys, 2006), attention 
(Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Scheider & Shiffrin, 1977), mental control (e.g., 
Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), self-regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996), and 
emotion (Teasdale, 1999). These theories share the idea that the two forms of 
cognitive processing are characterized specifically by their reliance on attentional 
control. Controlled attention or attentional control refers to the cognitive processes 
that focus attention in a goal-directed manner and resolve response competition and 
conflict in interference situations (Engle & Kane, 2004). In such cases psychologists 
also speak of “executive control” or “executive attention” (e.g., Baddeley & Logie, 
1999; Engle, 2002; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Posner & DiGirolamo, 2000) to 
emphasize family resemblance to more general theories of executive functioning. As 
the term controlled attention is more concrete and understandable I will use this term 
in the following text. 
Recently progress has been made in establishing the commonalities of the 
various domain specific dual-process theories (e.g. Kahneman, 2011). For the 
purpose of the present thesis I will borrow Kahneman’s (2011) distinction of System 
1 and System 2. System 1 is believed to operate automatically and quickly with 
hardly any effort as it does not depend upon controlled attention, whereas System 2 
is responsible for (effortful) mental activities that require controlled attention. 
According to Kahneman (2011, p. 24) both Systems are active whenever we are 
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awake: “System 1 runs automatically and System 2 is normally in a comfortable low-
effort mode, in which only a fraction of its capacity is engaged”.  
As one may imagine, successful sport performance most often requires 
System 1 as the many constraints (Davids, Button, Bennett, 2007) of successful 
sports performance such as extreme time pressure do not allow for the effortful slow 
activity of System 2. For example, Olympic champions like Michael Phelps or Usain 
Bolt do not need a whole lot of effortful thinking when elegantly racing through 
London’s 2012 Aquatic Centre or Olympic stadium. Similarly, Germany’s 
gymnastics star Fabian Hambüchen does not have to strain his attention on the 
successful execution of his silver medal winning horizontal bar routine—on the 
contrary this might even disturb smooth execution as predicted by the paralysis by 
analysis hypothesis (e.g. Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Hardy, Mullen, & 
Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992). US American Olympic “Dream Team” superstar Kobe 
Bryant also does not need to pay attention to skillfully dribbling the ball but instead 
can use his free attentional resources to find LeBron James underneath the “hoop” 
who then scores with a spectacular dunk.  
All these examples primarily highlight the involvement of the effortless 
System 1 and for this reason it is not surprising that a great deal of training in sports 
is undertaken precisely to circumvent the limitations of the slow effortful System 2 
and automate behaviors (e.g. Williams & Ericsson, 2005). In plenty of situations in 
sports System 1 will get the job done smoothly and efficiently but in some situations 
System 2 is required just as in the everyday example of a person from a right-hand 
traffic country crossing the road during the 2012 London Olympic Games. In such 
situations, when the situation demands a different behavior to that which one has 
become accustomed to, System 2 is required to deliberately control attention in 
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adapting behavior appropriately—i.e. to resolve response competition and conflict in 
interference situations. A sport example illustrative of resolving response 
competition is if a soccer defender anticipates that Bayern Munich’s right wing 
player Arien Robben always feints to the outside to then cut to the center and 
therefore positions himself accordingly. In this case Robben will need System 2 to 
adapt his behavior to the demands of the situation and not rely on his habitual 
behavior of cutting to the center.  
People also need System 2 to carry out intentions or action plans—i.e. focus 
attention in a goal directed manner. Kahneman (2011, p. 36) points out that probably 
the most important capability of System 2 is “the adoption of “task sets” [that] can 
program memory to obey an instruction that overrides habitual responses.” These 
task sets—e.g. instructions or self-generated intentions—are stored or activated in a 
special memory system called working memory (WM, Kahneman, 2011) which is a 
crucial cognitive system for controlling attention (e.g Engle, 2002) as will be 
demonstrated throughout this synopsis. 
Outline of Publications included in the Synopsis 
The synopsis of this cumulative dissertation outlines the eight peer-reviewed 
manuscripts in table 1 that investigate the involvement of System 2’s “centerpiece” 
working memory in controlling attention in sports and how this might contribute to 
expert performance in sports. The first part of the synopsis will illuminate a general 
mechanism of how WM controls attention in sports before I systematically 
investigate how individual differences in WM relate to attentional control and 
superior performance in sports (Vogel & Awh, 2008).  
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Table 1  
Publications Included in Synopsis  
I. Furley, P., & Memmert, D. (2010). The role of working memory in sports. 
International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 3, 171–194. 
 
II. Furley, P., & Memmert, D. (2013). “Whom should I pass to?” The more 
options the more attentional guidance from working. PLOS ONE 8(5): 
e62278. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0062278 
 
III. Furley, P., Memmert, D., & Heller, C. (2010). The Dark Side of Visual 
Awareness in Sport – Inattentional Blindness in a Real-World Basketball 
Task. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 72, 1327–1337. 
 
IV. Furley, P., & Memmert, D. (2012). Working Memory Capacity as 
controlled attention in tactical decision making. Journal of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 34, 322–344. 
 
V. Furley, P., & Memmert, D. (2010). Differences in spatial working memory 
as a function of team sports expertise: the Corsi Block-tapping Task in sport 
psychological assessment. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 110, 801–808. 
 
VI. Furley, P., Memmert, D., & Schmid. S. (2013). Perceptual load in sport and 
the heuristic value of the perceptual load paradigm in examining expertise 
related perceptual-cognitive adaptations. Cognitive Processing, 14, 31–42. 
 
VII. Furley, P., & Memmert, D. (2011). Studying cognitive adaptations in the 
field of sport: Broad or narrow transfer? A comment on Allen, Fioratou, and 
McGeorge (2011). Perceptual & Motor Skills, 113, 2, 481–488.  
 
VIII. Memmert, D., & Furley, P. (2010). Beyond Inattentional Blindness and 
Attentional Misdirection: From Attentional Paradigms to Attentional 
Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition, 19, 1107–1109. 
 
Before describing the conducted studies, the relevant theoretical constructs 
and perspectives drawn upon in this thesis are introduced, which are reviewed in 
more detail in Publication I. In this first section I go on to highlight the close 
relationship of WM and attention from a cognitive information processing 
perspective and argue that this relationship can be considered a central cognitive 
mechanism in the control of attention. In Publications II and III I investigate how 
WM can control attention in sports and discuss what implications this might have for 
sport specific decision making. In the second part of the synopsis I use individual 
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difference in WM capacity and sport expertise to shed light on the importance of 
attentional control in sport. In this respect Publication IV tests whether a greater 
capacity of WM might be beneficial in some situations in sports as this greater 
capacity affords superior attentional control. If this were the case then it might be 
beneficial for athletes to have a greater WM capacity—either via a selection process 
or because they cognitively adapt to the specific constraints imposed upon them. This 
is discussed in Publications II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII and unpublished data. I end the 
synopsis by discussing the combined implications from the results obtained in the 
studies on attentional control in sports both from a theoretical and applied 
perspective. 
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Research questions addressed in the thesis. Specifically this thesis 
addresses three main research questions outlined in table 2. 
 
Table 2  
Research Questions Addressed in the Thesis. 
Research Question Addressed in 
I. How is attention controlled in sports and 
what role does WM play in this process? 
3 Experiments in 
Publications II 
a. What effects can instructions have 
on attentional control in sports? 
4 Experiments in 
Publications III 
II. When is controlled attention needed in 
sports and do athletes benefit in situations  
requiring controlled attention from having 
a greater WM capacity? 
2 Experiments in 
Publication IV 
III. Do athletes differ in their basic information 
processing capacity—specifically their 
attentional control capacity—compared to 
non athletes in a way which might 
contribute to sport expertise? 
3 Experiments in 
Publication V, VI, and 1 
unpublished Experiment 
 
 
Theoretical Background and Relevant Constructs1
Although I introduced dual-process theories in the introduction as a 
theoretical starting point, in the broadest possible sense the conducted studies are 
embedded in the information processing framework following the seminal work of 
Broadbent (1958) and Neisser (1967, 1976). For many years the study of the working 
of the mind, including memory and attention, was considered impossible and 
unscientific. It was not until the middle of the 20th century that psychologist started 
to experimentally study internal concepts, such as attention and memory, that lay 
 
                                                 
1  See Appendix I for more detail. 
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between stimulus and response. This experimental information processing approach 
to cognition forced psychologists to break down large problems and questions about 
the functioning of the human mind into very small and isolated aspects of cognition. 
Therefore cognitive psychologists were forced to concentrate on individual cognitive 
components, such as memory or attention, in isolation because it was highly difficult 
to experiment on multiple components at the same time. As a consequence, each area 
of research became increasingly specialized to answer ever more specific questions 
and in turn lost sight of how the individual cognitive components interact in 
everyday behavior (Styles, 2005). Neisser (1976, p. 7) recognized this problem and 
stressed that, despite the difficulty of studying cognition, psychologists have to make 
“a greater effort to understand cognition as it occurs in the ordinary environment and 
in the context of natural purposeful activity”.  
Similarly Broadbent (1971, p. 4) emphasizes his insistence that psychological 
theory has to be grounded in real-life experience:  
The researcher remote from immediate practical pressures may indeed be free 
to study major variables in which at this instant society does not seem to be 
interested; but he should not use this freedom in order to study minor 
variables, until there are no major ones within reach of our techniques. The 
necessity for some relevance to real life is a worthwhile intellectual 
discipline.  
If research on cognitive processes loses touch with real life contexts then 
laboratory studies may generate fundamental misunderstanding of human cognition 
and behavior (Kingston et al., 2003). Therefore, laboratory studies have to attempt to 
generalize from general laboratory paradigms to paradigms that are more 
representative of real world-situations (Kingston et al., 2003). 
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For example, in the field of memory research, a major advance in this regard 
was made by Baddeley and Hitch (1974, p. 47) with their concept of WM, who, just 
like Neisser (1976), acknowledged that studying cognitive concepts such as memory 
in isolation is problematic if the aim is to understand everyday behavior: “despite 
more than a decade of intensive research on the topic of short-term memory, we still 
know virtually nothing about its role in normal human information processing”. 
Since then further advances have been made that demonstrate the close interaction of 
cognitive concepts such as memory, attention, and perception that were formally 
studied in isolation (for a review see Styles, 2005).  
In the present synopsis I build on the progress that has been made in cognitive 
psychology by studying the interplay of the special cognitive component WM and 
attention to enhance understanding of the “natural purposeful activity” of sport 
performance. In this respect, I attempt to usefully apply cognitive psychological 
theory to inform knowledge of performance in the sports domain and (ii) further use 
the sports domain to advance cognitive psychological theory. Moran (2009) and 
Moran and Brady (2010) argue that the field of sports offers a fruitful domain to 
explore the validity of models developed in other fields. Further, it has been 
suggested that in some instances the field of sports offers a “rich and dynamic natural 
laboratory” to advance cognitive psychological theory (Moran, 2009, p. 420). In this 
endeavor it is inevitable to first briefly describe the cognitive components in question 
and their hypothesized function and relationship.  
Working Memory. Alan Baddeley (2012, p. 2) emphasizes that the concept 
of WM is one of the most researched topics currently in cognitive psychology by 
stating that “the topic of working memory has increased dramatically in citation 
counts since the early years, […] a recent attempt to review it (Baddeley 2007) ended 
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with more than 50 pages of references”. It has even been described in an amusing 
verse by Janice Keenan in Miyake and Shah’s book Models of Working Memory 
(1999, p. XVIII) which is well suited to both illustrate the main features (cf. figure 1) 
of this cognitive concept in a memorable way and further highlight the 
overwhelming amount of attention WM has received.  
 
  
“There once was a box called short-term store 
Whose function was storage and nothing more. 
But along came Alan Baddeley 
Whose subjects dual-tasked madly 
And WM replaced STS forever more. 
 
For those who’ve been living in caves 
Working memory is a system with slaves. 
They are independent buffers 
So neither one suffers 
When doing verbal memory and visual maze. 
 
While storage is the job of each little slave 
The central executive says how we behave 
It activates and controls all nodes 
Through a dopamine system acting as gates. 
 
The unanswered questions on WM abound 
Despite numerous studies whose findings are sound. 
What’s needed right now 
Is for us to see how 
We can put all these data on common ground.” 
Figure 1, left column. Baddeley’s revised model of WM incorporating links with 
long-term memory (Baddeley, 2002, p. 93). Right column. Janice Keenan’s Ode to 
WM.  
 
As described in Janice Keenan’s verse, WM can be defined as the cognitive 
mechanisms capable of retaining a small amount of information in an active state for 
use in ongoing tasks and it therefore seems hard to think of situations in which WM 
is not required. Therefore, researchers (for reviews, see Baddeley, 2007, Conway et 
al., 2007, Cowan, 2005, Miyake & Shah, 1999), have recognized the importance of 
WM in numerous laboratory and everyday situations. The most important advance of 
the WM model was the proposal of a system not only responsible for the storage of 
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information but also for mechanisms of cognitive control and attention (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974) which made the model applicable to complex behavior. The model 
comprises an attentional control system, the central executive, and three subsidiary 
storage systems, the phonological loop, responsible for holding speech-based or 
acoustic information, the visuospatial sketchpad, holding visual and spatial 
information, and the episodic buffer holding episodic amodal information (cf. figure 
1). For the purpose of this synopsis I mostly neglect the storage components of WM 
and focus on the processing aspect: the central executive (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974, 
Baddeley, 2003; Engle, 2002). 
Baddeley (2003) claims that the central executive is the most important, but 
least understood, component of WM. The first attempt to advance the concept came 
with the proposal (Baddeley, 1986) to adopt Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model of 
attentional control as the central executive. This model overlaps to a considerable 
extent with the aforementioned dual-process theories and closes the gap between 
WM and dual-process theories as both share the central tenet that behavior is 
controlled at two levels. The first is fairly automatic and based on habits and schemas 
(comparable to Kahneman’s System 1), whereby cues in the environment trigger the 
appropriate behavior—e.g., driving on one’s daily route to work. The other level is a 
mechanism for overriding such habits and was termed the Supervisory Attentional 
System (SAS, which is comparable to Kahneman’s System 2). The SAS is utilized 
when habit patterns are no longer adequate and attention has to be deployed in a 
goal-directed manner—e.g., if there are roadworks on one’s daily route to work and 
one is forced to take appropriate action to circumvent the obstruction (Shallice, 1988; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1991).  
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Attention. Humans have a limited information-processing capacity (for a 
review, see Broadbent, 1958; for a recent review, see Knudsen, 2007), and given the 
enormous amount of information that bombards people, it becomes essential for 
performance efficiency that the most task-relevant (or pertinent) information gets 
processed. Hence, our attentional system has evolved to limit processing to objects 
that are currently relevant for our behavior in a given situation as our sensory system 
cannot process all the available information (e.g. Broadbent, 1958; Neisser, 1967; 
Treisman, 1969; Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994). In the present synopsis, I adopt a 
very general definition of attention as mechanisms to increase or decrease the level 
of activation of internal or external representations (e.g. Pashler, Johnston, & 
Ruthruff, 2001).  
According to Pashler et al. (2001) attention increases or decreases the level of 
activation according to both the goals and needs people have and the stimuli that 
impinge on them. In this respect, attention can be regarded as lying on a continuum 
reflecting the relative influence of these two factors in their causation; internal 
representations—referred to as top-down processes—and external stimuli—referred 
to as bottom-up processes. There is a large body of evidence showing that stimulus-
driven factors such as sudden onsets of new stimuli (Yantis & Jonides, 1990; Yantis 
& Hillstrom, 1994) or salient stimuli (Lee, Itti, Koch, & Braun, 1999; Theeuwes 
1992; Braun 1999) capture or guide attention in a fairly automatic way. However, 
since humans are usually involved in some task or are striving to achieve some kind 
of goal, an entirely bottom-up dominated attentional system would be of little use. 
Therefore, people need some kind of mechanism for directing attention in a top-
down manner. Recent research demonstrated that this top-down directing of attention 
is likely to be controlled by the information held in WM at that time (e.g. Soto, 
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Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008 for a recent review). This proposed 
connection between WM and attention provides the starting point of the completed 
series of studies in this synopsis. 
Interaction of WM and attention. Scientists used to think of the relationship 
between attention and memory as operating only in one direction. Attention was 
conceptualized as a filter that selects only relevant information for access into the 
short-term processing stores (e.g. Atkinson & Schiffrin, 1968). Recent evidence 
demonstrates that there is a reciprocal relationship between the current contents of 
WM and attention. Hence, attention does not only allow access into WM but WM 
can also influence the guidance of attention (Awh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998; 
Downing, 2000; Huang & Pashler, 2007; Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005; 
Soto & Humphreys, 2007, 2008) by modulating the sensitivity of neural circuits in 
favour of the information currently being processed in WM (Gazzaley & Nobre, 
2012; Knudsen, 2007).  
Soto et al. (2008) argue that one reason for assuming a close link between 
attention and WM is that both seem to draw on a common pool of resources as 
indicated by a series of studies of Lavie (2005). For this reason, numerous 
researchers propose in large-scale theories of cognition that WM representations 
control the allocation of attention to objects that match features of the WM 
representations or are related to them (e.g., Anderson, Matessa, & Lebiere, 1997; 
Logan & Gordon, 2001). Of course, the properties of the external stimuli also play a 
role in determining the allocation of attention, as discussed before. An influential 
theory of attentional control that takes both bottom-up sensory factors and top-down 
WM factors into account is the biased competition theory (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995) of selective attention. 
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The biased competition theory of selective attention (BCT). Visual objects in 
the world compete for cognitive representation, analysis, and control at some point 
between stimulus input and response, and this information is biased towards 
information that is currently relevant for behavior (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). 
Thus, in a nutshell, the theory proposes that attention serves to enhance the response 
of behaviorally relevant neurons and that the effect of attention on neuronal 
responses is best understood as competition between competing stimuli and 
representations. For example, stronger sensory inputs usually have an advantage over 
weaker sensory stimuli, but the content of WM can bias the competition, tipping the 
balance towards the weaker stimuli. Hence, if a visual object is preactivated in WM 
and later appears in the visual display, this object will have an advantage in the 
competition for selective attention. The winner of this competition then becomes the 
focus of attention.  
More specifically the BCT proposes that objects that are present in a visual 
scene activate corresponding representations in the brain, which compete for both 
perceptual awareness and motor behavior. According to the BCT, top-down control 
is influenced by an internal template activated in the circuitry of WM, priming an 
object in the visual scene to the disadvantage of competing objects in the visual 
scene. It is suggested that these internal templates arise from WM (Chelazzi, Miller, 
Duncan, & Desimone, 1993; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Reynolds, Pasternak, & 
Desimone, 2000) and in turn bias neural activity that encode particular features of an 
object in the visual scene that become the focus of attention.  
Based on BCT I first conducted a series of studies addressing research 
question I: How is attention controlled in sports and what role does WM play in this 
process? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
General Mechanisms: Attentional Control by WM in Sports 
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Sport offers researchers an ideal setting to test BCT and follow the call of 
Kingston et al. (2003) to test attentional paradigms in a representative real world 
context because sports typically involve time pressured dynamic situations in which 
athletes have to employ attention efficiently in order to select one out of several 
decision options, e.g. which team-member to pass to. According to BCT, stronger 
sensory inputs usually have an advantage over weaker sensory stimuli, but the 
content of WM can bias the competition, tipping the balance towards the weaker 
stimuli. This assumption can be transferred to the context of sports as illustrated in 
the following example: a basketball point guard might not pass to a team-member 
under the “hoop” who is waving (stronger stimulus) but instead passes to the 
shooting guard at the three point line because of the intended offensive play 
announced by the coach during the last timeout, in which he was told that the team 
needs open 3-point shots in order to win the game. In this scenario the point guard is 
probably holding a representation of the player he is attempting to pass the ball to in 
his or her WM and according to BCT this representation is likely to bias attention 
towards that player and in turn increase the chances of passing the ball to this player. 
If this player is unmarked, then the activated template of that player will facilitate the 
decision to pass to him according to BCT. On the other hand, if the player is guarded 
by an opposing player, attention will still be allocated towards that player and will 
have to be reallocated towards an open team-member, which will consume valuable 
milliseconds of the limited time available in a fast moving sport.  
A further reason why team sports offers an ideal testing ground for BCT is 
the fact that there are usually numerous objects such as team-member passing 
opportunities and opponents competing for attention and action. Most of these visual 
objects are behaviorally relevant and compete for limited attentional resources. 
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Hence, if there are multiple competing objects in a complex time constrained sport 
scene then the top-down bias from WM might have a greater influence on attentional 
guidance as there is more competition to be resolved in very short time.  
Main Findings on Attentional Control from WM in Sports2
In three experiments participants (experienced athletes and novices) had to 
hold an image of a certain player in WM—which was controlled by a memory probe 
task—while engaged in a time constrained decision task.  
 
In Experiment 1 participants had to identify as quickly as possible which 
player—out of either 2 or 4 players—was in possession of the ball by pressing a 
corresponding key on the keyboard. The results support BCT by demonstrating that 
attention was controlled by a template held in WM. Response times were 
significantly faster when the object activated in the circuitry of WM matched (valid) 
the target object in the quick decision task—i.e. was the same as the player in 
possession of the ball—compared to when the player held in WM was not present 
among the available choices (neutral) or was present but was not in possession of the 
ball (invalid). Besides demonstrating attentional guidance from WM on the response 
time data the results from Experiment 1 further showed that the contents of WM also 
influence the number of impulsive decision errors. Therefore, the results demonstrate 
that there can be both benefits and costs from the attentional control from WM in 
sports.  
Interestingly, the attention guidance effect from WM was especially 
pronounced in complex situations in which more players were present in the visual 
array that could potentially be the target (ball holder). By increasing the number of 
potential “ball-holders” in the experimental task participants were required to 
                                                 
2 See Appendix II for full detail. 
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broaden their attentional window (Hernández, Costa, & Humphreys, 2010) which in 
turn increased attention guidance effects by WM as more objects were competing for 
attention.  
In Experiment 2 participants had to decide which player to pass to in a 
schematic team handball situation. The results demonstrated that if a team-sport 
athlete forms the intention to pass to a certain player—which we argue involves 
holding a representation of that player in WM—then his or her attention will be 
automatically directed towards this player and thereby facilitates the decision to pass 
to this player. In situations in which this player is unmarked this attentional guidance 
effect from WM is beneficial (valid trials), whereas it is detrimental in situations in 
which the player is guarded as attention is drawn to this player automatically and 
subsequently has to be reoriented towards a more suitable recipient of the pass. This 
pattern of results was evident both in the response time data and in the error rate data. 
Hence, holding a representation of a certain player in WM does not only influence 
attentional orientation but also the actual decision of whom to pass to. Again, as the 
complexity of the decision making situation increased (caused by more passing 
options), decision makers were affected to a greater extent by attentional control 
from WM as participants more often passed to a marked player who matched an 
activated representation in WM.  
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to make the experimental stimuli more 
representative of the visual demands athletes are confronted with during sporting 
performance. Therefore, we replaced the cartoon images from Experiment 1 and 2 by 
photographs of a basketball court and basketball players. In order to strengthen our 
argument that BCT is a helpful theory to explain how an athlete’s attention is 
controlled during decision making we followed the call of Kingston et al. (2003) of 
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increasing the external validity of the task. This point is further stressed by Fiedler 
(2011; see also Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) who pointed out the 
necessity of replicating effects found in one set of stimuli with different stimuli to 
ensure that the phenomenon of interest—in this case attentional guidance from WM 
in sport decision making—does not only apply to a certain set of stimuli or 
experimental paradigm but has general applicability regarding the behavior or 
phenomenon of interest. The results from Experiment 3 scrutinize the findings from 
Experiment 1 and 2 while increasing the external validity of the attentional guidance 
effect from WM in team-sport decision making. Hence, an athlete’s attention is 
guided towards certain team-members who resemble internal templates that are 
currently being held in WM. 
Answer to Research Question I: “How is attention controlled in sports 
and what role does WM play in this process”. The results from three experiments 
clearly show that the current contents of WM control an athlete’s focus of attention. 
Decision options receive a competitive advantage if they are associated with the 
activated contents in the circuitry of WM. This effect is especially pronounced in 
complex decision making situations with several decision options competing for 
attention. Based on these findings I suggest that the link between WM and attention 
can be considered a central mechanism in “everyday purposeful activities” (Neisser, 
1976) via its function to program top down attentional control.  
Hence, the results from Publication II provide evidence for Kahneman’s 
(2011) claim that an important function of System 2 is the adoption of “task sets” by 
programming memory to control attention. A useful analogy to clarify this 
mechanism is a thermostat (Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994). A thermostat is set to 
a specified temperature and then activates the heating system automatically when the 
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temperature diverges from the pre-set temperature without requiring any further 
intervention from the person who set the thermostat. Thus, the person controls the 
thermostat, but the control is executed “off-line”. Folk et al. (1994) claim that the 
same is true for attention, by stating that templates currently active in the circuitry of  
WM—such as team-member passing opportunities or higher level cognitive goals—
determine attentional control settings in advance and that external stimuli that match 
the internal representations to some degree will capture attention without any further 
cognitive involvement. 
I elaborate on such theorizing in the next section by addressing research 
question Ia whether certain instructions e.g. given by the coach can have a similar 
effect on attentional guidance as visual objects held in WM. 
The Effects of Instructions on Attentional Control in Sports3
In the previous section I showed that the contents of WM control attention in 
favor of certain information at the cost of different information. In this context, 
Williams, Davids, and Williams (1999) mentioned that “the coach should help 
performers to develop ‘mind-sets’ or expectations regarding which cues to attend to 
and which ones to ignore” (p. 54, see also Hageman & Memmert, 2006). In the next 
series of studies we investigated how coaches of team ball sports might be able to 
utilize instructions in this endeavor by guiding an athlete’s focus of attention to what 
are considered information-rich areas.  
 
In 4 experiments we investigated whether attention-guiding instructions can 
potentially induce an attentional set (Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005) or task 
set (Kahneman, 2011), directing the attentional focus of the players. To test this 
assumption we conducted a series of experiments embedded within the Inattentional 
                                                 
3 See Appendix III for full detail. 
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Blindness paradigm (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2005; Simons & Chabris, 
1999) which has close connections to the attentional WM literature (Fougnie & 
Marois, 2007; Todd, Fougnie, & Marois, 2005; De Fockert & Bremner, 2011). In a 
typical inattentional blindness paradigm a specific attentional set or task set is 
induced that controls the focus of attention of the participants while at some point an 
unexpected event occurs that is not part of the task set. For example in the most 
prominent inattentional blindness paradigm (Simons & Chabris, 1999) participants 
were asked to count how many times a group of players wearing white shirts passed 
a ball, while ignoring passes by another group of players wearing black shirts. This 
activated a task set in WM that enhanced the attention paid to white representations 
and decreased the activation of black representations to the extent that participants 
even missed a man in a black gorilla costume walking through the visual display.  
In this regard, we tested whether tactical instructions can have a similar 
negative effect on tactical decision making in sports by inducing a task set that 
guides attention away from important information (Furley, Memmert, & Heller, 
2010, Appendix III). Of relevance in this respect, Moores, Laiti, and Chelazzi (2003; 
see also Duncan & Humphreys, 1989) review evidence that top-down control signals 
from WM representations do not only raise the activity of object representations in 
the visual scene that match the internal template in some properties, but this 
activation also spreads to associated representations. Therefore, the attentional focus 
is also biased towards objects that are merely associated with the current templates in 
WM. A finding in line with this proposal is that words held in WM direct eye 
movements towards semantically related images (Huettig & Altmann, 2005). More 
recent studies (Soto & Humphreys, 2007; Huang & Pashler, 2007) corroborated these 
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findings by showing that verbal items that were activated in the circuitry of WM 
facilitated visual search of semantically related visual objects. 
In our paradigm participants again had to make a tactical decision for a 
specific player in a five on five basketball video situation. As is common procedure 
in basketball training we induced an attentional set by instructing the participant that 
the position of their direct opponent is important for their tactical decision and that 
they therefore have to not only decide what they would do in the situation but further 
report the position of their direct opponent in this situation (as being either close to 
them or far away; or what the positioning of the feet was of their direct opponent). In 
one critical trial there was an unexpectedly free team-mate and passing to him was 
rated as the best tactical decision making option by basketball experts. We compared 
the frequency of passing to this free team-mate once with the instruction of focusing 
on the direct opponent and without this instruction. The results demonstrate that 
experienced basketball players often did not pass to the unmarked player if they 
received the attention-guiding instructions about the defensive player compared to 
when they did not receive these instructions.  
All four experiments demonstrated that sport specific instructions can induce 
an attentional set that results in basketball players’ missing important game-relevant 
information. In Experiment 2, we found that players with hardly any basketball 
experience were more prone to this effect, as compared with experienced athletes4
                                                 
4 A point I discuss in more detail when focusing on expertise related questions of attentional 
control in the second part of the synopsis. 
. 
The effect of attentional guidance on tactical decision making remained unchanged  
while improving the ecological validity of the setting by enhancing the perception–
action coupling (Experiment 3) and increasing the task difficulty (Experiment 4). 
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Answer to Research Question Ia: “What effects can instructions have on 
attentional control in sports?” In Furley et al. (2010) we argue that coaches 
frequently give specific instructions and introduce predetermined offensive plays 
(e.g., American football, basketball, or handball) in order to reduce the complexity of 
the game and give guidance to the decision maker by directing his or her attentional 
focus (cf. Williams et al., 1999). These offensive strategies usually include only a 
subset of the players, and the decision maker therefore has to choose from only a 
limited number of possibilities. For this reason, it is possible that a player who is not 
part of a specific offensive strategy is unexpected and is not incorporated into the 
decision-making process. This is precisely what was modeled in this study and we 
were able to show that these attention guiding instructions can lead to important 
information being overseen.  
Hence, tactical instructions can induce an attentional set by programming 
memory to obey these instructions (Kahneman, 2011) and thereby affecting the 
decision making process of athletes. In some cases tactical instructions can be 
beneficial (see also Furley & Memmert, 2012, Appendix IV) by reducing the 
complexity of the time constrained decision (Williams et al., 1999) but as the 
reviewed experiments point out in other situations these instructions can be 
detrimental for decision making by guiding attention away from important 
information (Furley et al., 2010). In this regard the experiments further highlight the 
importance of System 2 (Kahneman, 2011) in the control of attention in sport 
specific decision making. Based on the reviewed experiments in this section, the link 
between WM and attentional control can be considered a central mechanism in sport 
by demonstrating that information currently activated in the circuitry of WM induces 
a task set that controls the focus of attention.  
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According to Cronbach (1957), a comprehensive account of human behavior 
can only be achieved through the synergy of experimental and differential 
approaches to psychology. Hence, in the second part of the synopsis I systematically 
use individual differences in WM to aid further understanding of attentional control 
in sports performance. The conducted studies utilized a combination of experimental 
approaches and individual difference approaches following a recent call of Vogel and 
Awh (2008) who argued that cognitive theory development can substantially benefit 
from combining an individual-difference approach with an experimental approach. 
As people differ substantially in numerous respects, Vogel and Awh (2007) argue 
that this diversity can usefully be exploited to constrain cognitive theory, also in 
sport. Thus, instead of treating individual and group differences as error variance, as 
is common procedure in experimental approaches (Cronbach, 1957), I argue that 
both group and individual differences are useful in shedding further light on the 
importance of WM and attention in sports. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Individual Differences: The Role of WM Capacity in Sports 
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I began this synopsis by introducing dual process theories as an overarching 
theoretical framework that state that behavior is determined by the interplay of 
automatic (System 1) and controlled processing (System 2; Kahneman, 2011) and 
that these two forms of processing are distinguished by their reliance on attentional 
control. In the first part of this synopsis I highlighted an important central 
mechanism of how System 2 uses WM to control attention. In the second part of the 
synopsis I focus on the question whether certain people are better at controlling their 
attention and therefore benefit in situations that require controlled attention. In this 
way I systematically use individual differences (Cronbach, 1957) to further 
investigate the involvement of System 2 in sports. 
Major progress has been made in measuring a person’s ability to control 
attention by demonstrating that certain measures of WM capacity (WMC; Conway, 
Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm, & Engle, 2005) have been successful in 
predicting performance in situations affording controlled attention in the presence of 
interference which has led to the formulation of the controlled attention theory of 
WMC (see Engle, 2002 for a review). In contrast to the original notion of capacity as 
an amount of information (e.g., Miller, 1956), the controlled attention theory of 
WMC states that WMC is a domain general measure, reflecting an individual’s 
ability to control his/her attention (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Kane, Bleckley, 
Conway, & Engle, 2001; Engle, 2002). Thus, the term WMC has been recently used 
to refer to “the attentional processes that allow for goal-directed behavior by 
maintaining relevant information in an active, easily accessible state outside of 
conscious focus, or to retrieve that information from inactive memory, under 
conditions of interference, distraction, or conflict” (Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & 
Engle, 2007b, p. 23). A large body of research has shown that people vary 
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considerably in their WMC (e.g., Conway et al., 2005) and that this diversity can be 
used to predict performance in domains that require controlled attention (Vogel & 
Awh, 2008). 
The main tenet of the controlled attention theory of WMC is that WMC tasks 
predict complex cognitive behavior such as reading and language comprehension 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; King & Just, 1991), reasoning (Kyllonen & Christal, 
1990), learning and fluid intelligence (Barret et al., 2004) or even bridge playing 
(Clarkson-Smith & Hartley, 1990), because of the domain general controlled 
attention component shared by these tasks and the WMC measures. Consistent with 
this view, a modification of the reading span task that requires mathematical 
processing instead of comprehending sentences is still an excellent predictor of 
language comprehension because language comprehension requires controlled 
attention (e.g., Engle, 2002).  
More direct evidence for the claim that WMC tasks measure a person’s 
ability to control attention has been derived from studies showing that WMC is not 
only predictive of high-level ability test scores and complex behavior but also of 
performance on low-level selective attention tasks such as the dichotic listening task 
(Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001); the Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 2003; Long & 
Prat, 2002); the antisaccade task (Kane et al., 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 
2004), and flanker tasks (Heitz & Engle, 2007). In addition, WMC does not only 
reliably predict attentional control in the laboratory, but further predicts people’s 
subjective experience of mind wandering in daily life (Kane et al., 2007a). Together 
these studies show that WMC tasks represent a domain free limitation in the ability 
to control attention that is predictive of an individual’s capability of staying focused, 
avoiding distraction, and impulsive errors. 
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Situations Requireing Controlled Attention in Sport 
In the introduction I argued that a lot of skilled sports performance does not 
require controlled attention as it can be carried out fairly automatically with hardly 
any or no reliance on WM (e.g. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) because a great deal of 
training is undertaken precisely in order to circumvent the limitations of WM and 
automate behaviors (Furley & Memmert, 2010, Appendix I; Williams & Ericsson, 
2005). The assumption that the cognitive demands decrease with continuous practice 
is common in the skill acquisition literature (e.g., Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 
1967; Schmidt, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). As skill level increases, 
information is restructured into a different type of skill representation, which is 
usually referred to as a procedure (Anderson, 1982). Procedural knowledge does not 
require the same amount of controlled attention as declarative knowledge involved in 
unpracticed skill execution in which the individual components of a skill are attended 
to in a step-by-step fashion. For this reason, a highly practiced soccer player does not 
need to attend to the execution of dribbling the ball, which allows him to utilize his 
freed attentional resources for other aspects of the sport, such as scanning for open 
team-mates.  
Controlled attention is not only not needed for the execution of well-learned 
skill execution it actually harms the smooth execution of the skill as suggested by 
prominent self-focus theories (Baumeister, 1984), such as the explicit monitoring 
hypothesis (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001), or the conscious processing hypothesis 
(Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992). 
In two studies (Publication IV, Appendix IV) I therefore addressed research 
question II: In what kind of sport situations might skilled athletes benefit from 
superior attentional control—besides the well-documented situations of learning new 
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skills (e.g. Fitts & Posner, 1967)—even if attentional control is not needed for 
successful skill execution in plenty of sport situations? In this regards the cognitive 
psychological literature (e.g., Engle, 2002) suggests that the ability to control 
attention is especially important during challenging activities in contexts (i) 
providing concurrent distraction and (ii) interference from prior experience or habit. 
Both of these circumstances frequently occur in competitive team sports situations: 
e.g. (i) team-sport athletes need to stay focused on performance while blocking out 
irrelevant distractions when, for example, shooting a decisive free throw in 
basketball while the opposing crowd is trying everything to disrupt the shooter’s 
concentration; (ii) athletes need to be able to quickly and efficiently select situation-
appropriate actions under extreme time pressure in high-interference situations: for 
example, when the quarterback in American football tries to find the open receiver in 
the final offensive play then suddenly notices a wide “corridor” and decides for a 
running play instead. 
Main Findings on WMC and Attentional Control in Sports5
WMC in avoiding distraction in sports. In regard to focusing attention and 
avoiding distraction we demonstrated that basketball players scoring high on WMC 
measures (Conway et al., 2005) were better able to focus their attention on a 
computer-based basketball decision making task while blocking out irrelevant 
auditory distraction (Furley & Memmert, 2012, Experiment 1). Hence, WMC 
remained predictive of controlling attention between different modalities in this 
representative sport performance context, as participants were required to attend to 
visually presented information to decide on a sport-specific tactical decision while 
ignoring a stream of auditory information presented over head phones. The fact that 
 
                                                 
5 See Appendix IV for full detail. 
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athletes with a high WMC reported hearing their own first name significantly less 
frequently in the unattended stream of auditory information shows that they were 
more successful in blocking out the task irrelevant auditory stream. In addition, the 
high WMC Basketball players appeared less prone to everyday distraction on the 
Cognitive Failure Questionnaire (CFQ, Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 
1982) compared to low WMC Basketball players, which supports the suggestion that 
WM is important in everyday attentional control. 
WMC in Resolving Response Competition in Sports. Athletes with a high  
WMC not only use their superior attentional control to focus on relevant information 
processing and blocking out distraction, but also use it for resolving competition 
between competing action tendencies and action plans (Engle, 2002 for a review). In 
line with the controlled attention theory of WMC, ice hockey players with a low 
WMC fail to adjust their tactical decisions to the demands of the game situation and 
more often “blindly” followed a tactical instruction they got from a virtual coach, 
even though it was not appropriate in the game situation (Furley & Memmert, 2012, 
Experiment 2). On the other hand ice hockey players with a high WMC were more 
proficient at adjusting their tactical decision to the demands of the situation instead 
of relying on the information they got during a simulated team time-out that was not 
appropriate for the following offensive game situation. No differences between high 
and low WMC ice-hockey players were evident in situations in which the tactical 
information they got in the team time-out was helpful for the following game 
situation as there was no competition to be resolved and therefore the situation did 
not require attentional control. 
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Answer to Research Question II: “When is Controlled Attention Needed in 
Sports and Do Athletes Benefit in Situations Requiring Controlled Attention 
from Having a Greater WM Capacity?” 
The ability to control attention is especially important in situations providing 
concurrent distraction and in situations in which dominant action tendencies interfere 
with successful performance. Two experiments showed that WMC is predictive of 
successful performance in such situations due to a superior ability to control attention 
of high WMC athletes. The present research followed a recent suggestion in the 
cognitive psychology literature (Vogel & Awh, 2008) of how to “exploit diversity for 
scientific gain.” Accordingly, we used WMC as individual difference variable to 
demonstrate the involvement of the central executive component of WM in staying 
focused on sport-specific performance and adequately resolving response 
competition during tactical decision making, which are both highly important feats in 
team sports.  
Given the importance of attentional control in team sport situations it seems 
feasible that this capacity might be an important factor contributing to team sport 
expertise. Expertise research in sport has received a great amount of research 
attention in the last decades. Hence, I investigated how attentional control capacities 
might contribute to team-sport expertise in the next chapter.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Individual Differences: Team Sport Expertise, WM, and Attention 
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The study of how athletes reach and stay at the pinnacle of their respective 
sports or what factors contribute to superior performance in sport has received a great 
deal of attention by sport expertise researchers (Starkes & Ericsson, 2003 for a 
review). On a very general level expertise can be defined as the ability of a person to 
consistently demonstrate superior levels of performance in a specific domain over an 
extended time period (Starkes, 1993). Knowledge of the factors that limit and 
contribute to superior sport performance are important for several reasons: (i) this 
knowledge provides a basis for deriving types of practice and training that are most 
efficient for performance enhancement (Ericson, 2006); (ii) to predict who has the 
best chances of being successful in a particular sport (Williams & Reilley, 2000); 
(iii) on a theoretical level to test general theories of skill acquisition and expertise 
(Williams & Ericsson, 2005).  
Athletes are required to adapt to specific constraints (Davids et al., 2007) 
imposed by the sporting environment to perform successfully or circumvent potential 
performance decrements. Until fairly recently great athletes were considered an 
“assemblage of physical prowess” so researchers did not pay much attention to 
cognitive factors involved in expert sport performance (Starkes, Helsen, & Jack, 
2001). Today most scientists acknowledge the important role of cognitive processes 
in sporting performance which has led to a substantial accumulation of literature 
(Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & Hoffman, 2006; Hagemann, Tietjens, & Strauß, 
2007; Starkes & Ericsson, 2003; Sternberg, & Grigorenko, 2003; Williams & 
Hodges, 2004) which broadly states that expert sport performers gain an advantage 
by acquiring cognitive skills and strategies through deliberate practice that increase 
their efficiency of processing information (e.g. Eccles, 2006). According to Williams 
et al. (1999), these adaptations are essential because the speed of many sports may 
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exceed the basic information-processing capacities of athletes. A topic of recent 
controversy within the expertise literature is the possible cognitive adaptations that 
occur as a function of extensive practice in sports. 
A large body of evidence supports the specific processing hypothesis, which 
has recently also been named narrow transfer hypothesis (Chabris & Simons, 2010). 
This narrow transfer hypothesis is embedded in the theoretical framework of “Long-
term Working Memory” (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) which in a nutshell states that 
expert performers bypass their natural processing limitations by acquiring special 
knowledge structures that function as associations between encoded information and 
retrieval cues in long-term memory. Hence, in order to retrieve the encoded 
information experts must reinstate the encoding conditions by using the same 
retrieval cues (Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012). In this manner Long-Term 
Working Memory becomes available for expert performers—but only in their 
specific field of expertise—and enables them to behave adaptively to the situational 
demands of their performance environment. Therefore, the narrow transfer 
hypothesis suggests that people with years of experience in an activity such as team 
sports, playing an instrument, or playing chess only differ in cognitive processing 
skills directly related to their field of experience and that those skills do not translate 
to different domains due to adaptations in “basic” cognitive abilities such as memory 
capacity, perceptual acuity, or intelligence (e.g., Eccles, 2006; Ericsson et al., 2006; 
Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, 2006). For example, expert chess players do not have 
greater memory capacity, per se, but do have a greater memory capacity for 
meaningful chess configurations (Chase & Simon, 1973). 
On the other hand, researchers have suggested that there might be more 
general cognitive enhancements from competitive sport participation: “we believe 
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there may be both sport specific and sport general cognitive enhancements from 
competitive sport training” (Voss, Kramer, Basak, Prakash, & Roberts, 2010. p. 
813); “It is possible that good [soccer] players actually develop better executive 
functions, although these functions have been largely regarded as relatively stable 
through life” (Vestberg, Gustafson, Maurex, Ingvar, & Petrovic, 2012, p. 4). These 
statements are representative of the broad transfer hypothesis that suggests that 
adaptations in basic cognitive abilities occur as a result of prolonged experience in 
activities such as flying an airplane (Bellenkes, Wickens, & Kramer, 1997), action 
video-game playing (Green & Bavelier, 2003, 2006), air traffic control (Allen, 
McGeorge, Pearson, & Milne, 2004), or competitive sports training (Voss et al., 
2010, Vestberg et al., 2012). Specifically, the broad transfer hypothesis assumes that 
practice in a certain activity can potentially lead to adaptations in basic cognitive 
abilities which in turn transfer to various different skills in more remotely related 
domains. 
Nobody seriously doubts that athletes specifically adapt to the constraints of 
their respective performance environments by acquiring specific knowledge (Starkes 
& Ericsson, 2003; Mann, Williams, Ward, & Janelle, 2007; Williams & Ford, 2008) 
which is highlighted in a recent review article (Hambrick & Meinz, 2012, p. 276): 
“So it is clear that domain knowledge is a major source of “power” in complex 
tasks”. The controversial question however is whether athletes also adapt on a 
general cognitive ability level—e.g. have a greater WMC that affords superior 
attentional control—beyond these specific adaptations (Allen, Fioratou, & 
McGeorge, 2011; Eccles, 2006; Ericsson et al., 2006; Furley & Memmert, 2010, 
Appendix V; 2011, Appendix VII; Vestberg et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2010). This 
question (research question III) is addressed in the next section.  
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Attentional Control Capacities in Expert (Team Sport) Athletes6
It has been suggested that success in team sports such as soccer—apart from 
physical skills and abilities—also depends on the general information processing 
capacities given the complex time-constrained environments (Vestberg et al. 2012; 
Voss et al., 2010). Vestberg et al. (2012, p. 1) go on to suggest that “many of the 
required skills in team sports may be translated to general cognitive domains where 
test results can be compared to a population norm. A good team player could be 
characterized by excellent spatial attention, divided attention, working memory, and 
mentalizing capacity.” Using a standardized neuropsychological assessment tool (D-
KEFS; Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001) to measure executive functions—i.e. WM—
of high and low level soccer players, Vestberg et al. (2012) report superior executive 
functions of high level players compared to low level players. Further, both soccer 
groups scored higher on the D-KEFS compared to a standardized norm group. In 
addition these test scores were predictive of the goals scored and assists of the tested 
soccer players two years later (based on a partial correlation of the square root of the 
goals/assists and the test scores).  
 
In addition, a recent meta-analysis (Voss, et al., 2010) on the sport/cognition 
relationship found a small-to-medium effect indicating that expert athletes performed 
better compared to novices on measures of processing speed and several attentional 
paradigms. Therefore, Voss, et al. (2010) seem to provide convincing evidence for 
the broad transfer hypothesis by aggregating the results of twenty studies on the sport 
cognition relationship in a meta-analysis. 
On the other hand, we repeatedly failed to find a similar association between 
WM, attention, and sport expertise in our own studies. The data from Furley and 
                                                 
6 See Appendix IV, V, and VI for more detail. 
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Memmert (2012, Appendix IV) did not indicate any differences in the central 
executive component of WM that is involved in the control of attention between 
expert athletes and standardized control populations. Given the results of Vestberg et 
al. (2012) it is surprising that experienced basketball players (Counting Span Score: 
M =.65, SD =.07) actually performed slightly worse compared a standardized norm 
population (Kane et al., 2004, Counting Span Score: M = .69; SD = 0.15). Expert ice-
hockey players (Automized Oeration Span Score: M = 39.82, SD =18.3) did not 
show any differences compared to a standardized norm population (Unsworth et al., 
2005, Automized Oeration Span Score: M = 39.16; SD = 17.4). Hence, expert team 
sport athletes did not differ on two of the most commonly used measures on 
executive functioning in cognitive psychology.  
The WMC measures used in Furley and Memmert (2012) have excellent 
psychometric properties (Conway et al., 2005) and have been validated in terms of 
measuring controlled attention in everyday situations (Furley & Memmert, 2012; 
Kane et al., 2007a) and in team sport situations (Furley & Memmert, 2012). 
Whereas, the measures (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001) used in Vestberg 
et al. (2012) have only been validated as predictive of clinical disorders. In addition 
the D-KEFS has recently been criticized based on its psychometric properties 
(Baron, 2004; Schmidt, 2003). 
In a further study (study in preparation for publication) I did not find any 
difference (t(58) = .746, p = .46) between high class (M = .71; SD = .097) and low 
class athletes (M = .73; SD = .087) across two different team sports (N = 15 soccer 
players, N = 15 handball players) and two individual sports (N = 15 track and field 
athletes, N = 15 swimmers) on WMC as measured by the counting span task (Kane et 
al., 2004). There was also no significant difference (t(58) = .786, p = .44) between 
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team sport (M = .73; SD = .084) and individual athletes (M = .71; SD = .1) which 
might have been expected based on the argumentation of Vestberg et al. (2012, p. 1) 
that a “good team player could be characterized by excellent spatial attention, 
divided attention, working memory, and mentalizing capacity.” A further well-
controlled study with a large sample size did not find differences between expert 
team sport athletes, expert track athletes, and novices on several state of the art 
attention tasks (Memmert, Simons, & Grimme, 2009). A study including 112 
participants also found no differences in the spatial storage component of WM 
between experienced basketball players and college students with no team-sport 
experience (Furley & Memmert, 2010, Appendix V).  
Moreover, Publication II (Appndix II) highlighted the important role of WM 
in controlling attention but did not find any differences between a expert group and a 
novice group across three experiments in attentional control. In Publication VI 
(Appendix VI) we transferred a further attentional paradigm to sports—the 
perceptual load paradigm (Lavie, 2005)—that measures distractor interference and 
has been validated as predictive of controlled attention in everyday live (Foster & 
Lavie, 2007). Again, we did not find any differences between expert athletes and 
novices indicative of superior attentional control in the perceptual load paradigm. 
Given these ambiguous findings I elaborate on possible explanations that might 
account for some of the different results before answering research question III. 
Cognitive adaptations in the field of sport? In this section I will first offer a 
potential alternative explanation for the small-to-medium effect size of enhanced 
processing speed and superior attentional abilities obtained in the meta-analysis 
(Voss et al., 2010). I then go on to discuss why some studies might find superior 
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executive functions of e.g. elite soccer players (Vestberg et al., 2012) in contrast to 
our own studies. 
In Furley & Memmert (2011, Appendix VII) I argue that publication bias is 
an important phenomenon when attempting to draw conclusions on the relationship 
of sports engagement and cognitive adaptations. According to Riniolo (1997), 
publication bias is defined as the increased likelihood of publishing a manuscript 
reporting statistically significant—e.g. differences between expert and novice 
athletes—rather than non-significant results. Publication bias is caused by both a 
submission bias which occurs before the review process and a selection bias that 
occurs during the review process (Cooper, DeNeve, & Charlton, 1997). Evidence for 
this phenomenon has not only been found in psychology but also in medicine and 
biology (Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995; Cumming, Fidler, Leonard, 
Kalinowski, Christiansen, Kleinig, et al., 2007). As a result, publication bias can be 
responsible for an effect in the literature which actually does not exist, or for 
distorting the effect size in the literature (Rosenthal, 1979). Therefore, the small-to-
medium effect of Voss, et al. (2010) may actually represent a much smaller effect 
which is distorted due to a publication bias as scientists do not write up their non-
significant results due to anticipated problems during the peer review process7
Publication bias might be the reason for a significant effect in the meta 
analysis (Voss et al., 2010) but this phenomenon cannot explain why some studies 
find an effect of sport expertise e.g. on executive functions (e.g. Vestberg et al., 
2012) whilst our studies fail to find such an effect.  
.  
A potential alternative explanation for significant effects of sport expertise on 
basic cognitive capacities compared to the broad transfer hypothesis might be 
                                                 
7  See Appendix VII for more detail. 
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confounding variables associated with sport expertise. An important confounding 
variable that requires careful attention when studying the relationship of sport and 
cognition is physical fitness. Recent research (Hertzog, Kramer, Wilson, & 
Lindenberger, 2008; Kramer, Hahn, Cohen, Banich, McAuley, Harrison, et al., 1999) 
has demonstrated enhanced cognitive functioning as a consequence of increased 
physical fitness. Specifically, aerobic exercise has been shown to affect cognitive 
functioning in the prefrontal cortex which is closely related to WM and executive 
functioning (Hillmann, Erickson, & Kramer, 2008). While most of the literature has 
demonstrated the beneficial influence of aerobic fitness on executive functions in 
older adults (e.g. Colcombe, & Kramer, 2003; Kramer et al., 1999) there is now 
converging evidence linking executive control functions, such as selective attention 
and interference control to physical activity among children (Buck, Hillman, & 
Castelli, 2008; Hillman, Buck, Themanson, Pontifex, & Castelli, 2009). Thus, 
differences between non-athletes and athletes on cognitive tests may not have been 
caused by the fact that athletes cognitively adapted to the demands of the sport or by 
selection issues that favor superior attentional abilities, but instead simply by 
increased fitness of athletes compared to non-athletes. Concerning the attentional 
control capabilities as measured by WMC tasks I found tentative evidence (study in 
preparation for publication) for this assumption as hours of sport/physical activity 
(across a variety of sports) per week and WMC were significantly correlated (r (n 
=75) = .315; p = .003).  
A further study addressing the question whether athletes excel at everyday 
tasks due to their sport expertise acknowledges this confounding variable by stating: 
“To gain insight into the role of fitness and athletics in multitasking, future research 
should include a high-fit age-matched group, especially given many reports that 
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demonstrate enhanced brain structure and function with high levels of aerobic 
fitness” (Chaddock, Neider, Voss, Gaspar, & Kramer, 2011, p. 1925). Besides 
mentioning aerobic fitness this study reveals that a further important variable to take 
into account is simple reaction time when studying the relation between sport 
expertise and cognition. Hence, differences in laboratory tests—that often involve 
response times—between athletes and non-athletes that propose to measure certain 
executive functions, such as attentional control, might be caused simply by faster 
reaction times of athletes and not by enhanced attentional capacities. 
Answer to Research Question III. “Do (Team Sport) Athletes Differ in Their 
Basic Cognitive Processing Capacity Compared to Non-athletes which might 
Contribute to Sport Expertise?” 
Currently data on the sport-cognition relationship are mixed and clearly more 
research is called for to illuminate this important topic. Based on our own findings I 
would answer the question with a “No”: team sport athletes do not possess superior 
basic information processing capacities—e.g. a superior ability to control attention. 
The only evidence for expert/novice differences in my own data was apparent in 
Furley et al. (2010) that showed that expert basketball players more often than 
novices noticed an unexpected open passing option when their attention was engaged 
in a monitoring task that was highly specific to the sport of basketball (see Appendix 
III for full detail). This finding is in line with the specific processing hypothesis. 
Whereas I could not provide any evidence for a relationship between basic 
attentional capacities and sport expertise, as for example Vestberg et al. (2012) or 
Voss et al. (2010). 
Therefore, based on the existing evidence I am not convinced that expert team 
sport athletes have superior attentional control capacities compared to normal, 
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physically active controls. I do not doubt that attentional control (i.e WMC) is a 
highly important attribute in certain sport situations—as I have explicitly stated in 
Furley and Memmert (2012, Appendix IV)—but currently the evidence does not 
suggest that superior attentional control capacities significantly contribute to team 
sport expertise or even that WMC is a limiting factor for successful team sport 
performance. Attentional control capabilities seem to differ to a similar extent from 
athlete to athlete just as in the “general population”. Those team sport athletes that 
are “lucky” to have a large WMC will most likely have advantages in some sport 
situations that demand controlled attention as in Furley and Memmert (2012). On the 
other hand athletes high in WMC might do less well in other situations as I will 
discuss in the next chapter based on recent findings in cognitive psychology. 
Given the ambiguous findings and methodological problems that do not allow 
a conclusive answer to research question III, I give some recommendations based on 
Publication VII and VIII for future research on this topic in the chapter conclusions 
and prospects. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Prospects 
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 This chapter will provide a detailed synthesis of the work presented in the 
thesis and outline its implications for both theory and practice. The limitations of the 
work are discussed, as well as potential avenues for future research on attentional 
control in sports.  
Aims of the Thesis 
The general aim of the present thesis was to examine the role of WM in 
controlling attention in sports from an information processing perspective 
(Broadbent, 1958; Neisser, 1967, 1976). By adopting dual-process theories 
(Kahneman, 2011; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) as an overarching theoretical 
framework I attempted to highlight a general mechanism of how WM controls 
attention, what sport situations require controlled attention, and whether athletes with 
higher attentional control capacities benefit in situations requiring controlled 
attention. Finally, I aimed to address the controversy in the literature whether basic 
abilities such as WMC contribute to sport expertise.  
Summary of Key Findings 
Specifically I addressed three research questions. Table 3 gives an overview 
of the empirical answers to these questions based on the conducted studies.  
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Table 3  
Answers to Research Questions Addressed in the Thesis. 
Research Question Empirical Answer 
I. How is attention controlled 
in sports and what role does 
WM play in this process? 
 
Baddeley’s model of WM comprises a central 
cognitive system responsible for short-term 
storage and an attentional control mechanism. 
Three experiments conclusively showed that 
the contents activated in the visual storage 
component of WM control the focus of 
attention. Hence, visual objects receive a 
competitive advantage in influencing behavior 
if they are congruent with the active contents in 
the storage components of WM in sport 
specific decision making. 
 
Ia. What effects can 
instructions have on 
attentional control in sports? 
 
In 4 experiments we demonstrated that sport-
specific instructions activated in the 
phonological storage component of WM induce 
an attentional set that controls the focus of 
attention of athletes during decision making 
which—in some cases—can lead to important 
information being overseen.  
 
II. When is controlled attention 
needed in sports and do 
athletes benefit in situations 
requiring controlled attention 
from having a greater working 
memory capacity? 
 
In two experiments we demonstrated that the 
central executive component of WM is 
responsible for attentional control in sport 
situations affording concurrent distraction and 
in situations in which dominant action 
tendencies interfere with successful 
performance. Athletes with a greater capacity 
to control attention—i.e. WMC—therefore 
benefit in these interference situations.  
 
III. Do athletes differ in their 
basic information processing 
capacity—specifically their 
attentional control capacity—
compared to non athletes, 
which might contribute to sport 
expertise? 
Currently ambiguous findings exist on this 
important topic. Our own data suggests that 
athletes do not possess superior basic 
information processing capacities—e.g. a 
superior ability to control attention (measured 
by WMC tasks) and only differ on highly sport 
specific processing skills.  
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Theoretical Implications of the findings 
The findings reviewed in this thesis have important theoretical implications 
for theories both of attention and expertise. Further, the theoretical implications can 
be subdivided according to Moran (2009) in findings that (i) usefully apply cognitive 
psychological theory to inform knowledge of performance in the sports domain and 
in findings that (ii) use the sports domain to advance cognitive psychological theory. 
Hence, I first describe the theoretical implications of the findings for sport 
psychological theory—as the majority of the findings fall into this category—before 
I go on to highlight the ways in which some of the findings can be regarded as 
advancements in general psychological theory.  
Implications for attentional theory in sport. In the introduction I cited 
Boucher (2008, p. 326) who stated that “a suitable framework to study the influence 
of attention on sport skills has not been established”. In this respect the results 
demonstrate that the WM framework (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974, Baddeley, 2003; 
Engle, 2002) as it relates to dual-process theories (Kahnemann, 2011; Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977) seems highly suited to addressing the shortcoming as the attentional 
control by the activated contents of WM seems a central mechanism that is capable 
of reconciling several lines of attentional research in sport psychology. Hence, it 
seems conceivable that the control of attention by the activated contents in WM—as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3—does not only apply to decision making but generalizes 
to a whole range of situations in sporting contexts.  
For example, Attentional Control Theory (ACT, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, 
& Calvo, 2007) assumes that anxiety leads to attention shifts aimed at detecting the 
source of the threat causing the anxiety. In this respect anxiety-induced worries held 
in WM seem to direct the focus of attention toward threatening stimuli. Wilson, 
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Wood, and Vine (2009) found tentative evidence for such theorizing in the field of 
sport by demonstrating that anxious participants were more likely to focus on the 
‘threatening’ goalkeeper in a football penalty kick than less anxious players. 
Similarly, performance decrements due to paralysis by analysis (Baumeister, 
1984; Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr, 2004; Gray, 2004) might also be 
reconciled by the WM attention relationship as it seems feasible that WM not only 
controls the external focus of attention but also the internal focus of attention. 
Baumeister (1984) suggests that pressure raises self-consciousness and worry about 
performing correctly. These self-conscious thoughts will be active in WM. In the 
attempt to avoid performance decrements attention is directed by these self-
conscious thoughts to the step-by-step execution of movement (Beilock et al., 2004; 
Gray, 2004). Paradoxically, this has exactly the opposite effect to that intended. 
Instead of avoiding performance decrements by directing attention to skillful 
execution, various studies (e.g. Baumeister, 1984; Beilock et al., 2004; Gray, 2004) 
found evidence that this explicit attention disrupts well learned skills, because 
System 2 (Kahneman, 2011) is too slow to deal with the real time control of the 
proceduralized skills. 
In addition, the fact that individual differences in WMC predicted 
performance in situations requiring controlled attention in sports as reviewed in 
Chapter 4 not only demonstrates that controlled attention is needed to successfully 
perform in specific sport situations but also highlights the cognitive mechanism 
responsible for controlled attention—the central executive component of WM 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Hence, the central executive component of WM proved to 
be responsible for staying focused on sport-specific performance and adequately 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS     51 
 
 
resolving response competition during tactical decision making, which are both 
highly important feats in team sports. 
Implications for general attentional theory. Recently Kingston and 
colleagues (2003, p. 177) stated that “our research suggests that laboratory studies 
conceived and interpreted in isolation from real-world experience may do far worse 
than fail to generalize back to the natural environment; they may generate 
fundamental misunderstanding of the principles of human attention”. Hence, the 
most important implication of the conducted studies for general theories of attention 
is that—contrary to the findings reviewed in Kingston et al. (2003) on attentional 
orienting—WM remained predictive of controlled attention in experimental settings 
representative of sport decision making. Therefore, WM theory can be considered a 
helpful theoretical framework for studying attention in the real world and explaining 
complex human behavior.  
In addition, and in agreement with Moran’s (2009, p. 420) claim that sports 
can offer a “rich and dynamic natural laboratory” to advance cognitive psychological 
theory, I wish to highlight several findings in which the conducted studies advanced 
current understanding in cognitive psychology.  
First, in Publication II we extended previous work on the biased competition 
theory of attention by demonstrating that attentional guidance effects were not only 
evident in the response times but also in errors in the decision task, which suggests 
that once the focus of attention has been guided towards a memory matching object 
this object also receives a competitive advantage in influencing behavior—i.e. in the 
context of sports, passing to a certain player even if this player is guarded by an 
opponent player.  
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Further, and of particular theoretical interest, the attentional control effect 
from WM increased in tandem with the complexity of the situation. An increase in 
complexity of the decision making situation in sport requires athletes to adopt a 
broader attentional focus which results in greater attentional guidance effects as there 
is more information competing for limited attentional capacity. Therefore the 
contents of WM had a greater effect on resolving the competition between the 
objects in the visual scene and choosing a passing option. Desimone and Duncan 
(1995) suggest that objects in the world compete for cognitive representation, 
analysis, and control sometime between stimulus input and response and that this 
competition is biased towards information that is currently relevant for behavior. As 
humans have a limited information processing capacity, the currently activated 
contents of WM bias attention in order to resolve the competition in favor of the 
behaviorally most relevant visual objects. Following this argumentation it seems 
logical that stronger attentional guidance effects from WM should emerge the more 
objects compete to influence behavior, as was the case in Publication II. 
As a further novel contribution to the cognitive psychological literature, 
evidence in Publication IV demonstrated that WMC remains predictive of controlling 
attention between different modalities in a sport performance context, as participants 
were required to attend to visually presented information to decide on a sport-
specific tactical decision while ignoring a stream of auditory distraction. This finding 
is of theoretical interest because it directly contrasts with modality specific views of 
attention (Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; Schneider & Detweiler, 1988; Soto-
Faraco, Morein-Zamir, & Kingstone, 2005) which argue that attentional capacity and 
temporary storage are peculiar to each modality and representations in one modality 
should therefore not interfere with representations in another.  
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Implications for expertise theory in sport and in general. A major topic of 
interest in both psychology and sport science is how people achieve high levels of 
skills in such areas as sports, music, or other games (see Hambrick & Meinz, 2011 
for a recent review). This topic is deeply embedded in the long-standing nature 
versus nurture debate (e.g. Ridley, 2003) that concerns the relative influence of 
innate factors versus learning and experience in determining e.g. skill level or 
expertise. Sir Francis Galton (1869, p. 38) expressed an extreme form of the nature 
view upon discovering that eminence runs in families: “if the ‘eminent’ men of any 
period, had been changelings when babies, a very fair proportion of those who 
survived and retained their health up to fifty years of age, would, notwithstanding 
their altered circumstances, have equally risen to eminence”. On the other hand, John 
Watson (1930/1970, p. 2012) proposed the opposing nurture view in its extreme 
form: “practicing more intensively than others, is probably the most reasonable 
explanation we have today not only for success in any line, but even for genius”.  
Today, the extreme versions of the nature and nurture views have become less 
popular and most researchers acknowledge the importance of both acquired 
characteristics and basic abilities (Hambrick & Meinz, 2011). However, it is not clear 
what basic abilities might contribute to expertise in different domains. For example, 
sport expertise research has been greatly influenced by research on expertise in the 
field of chess (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965) which arguably has quite 
different requirements from e.g. team sports. Conclusive evidence exists in both 
domains that acquired domain specific knowledge contributes to superior 
performance in both sports (for a review, see Starkes et al., 2001; William et al., 
1999) and chess (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965). It has been suggested that 
this acquired domain specific knowledge serves to circumvent performance 
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limitations (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) associated with basic abilities, 
e.g. WMC: “Performers can acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on working 
memory capacity” (Ericsson & Charness, 1994, p. 725).  
In a series of studies Hambrick and Meinz (2011) challenged the 
circumvention of limits hypothesis (Ericsson et al., 1993) by demonstrating that 
WMC is associated with superior performance in complex tasks even in expert 
individuals with high levels of domain-specific knowledge. Hence, Hambrick and 
Meinz (2011, p. 278) conclude that “available evidence does not justify the claim 
that basic abilities are always unimportant for skilled performance: There is now 
good evidence that basic abilities predict success in a wide range of complex tasks, 
from chess to music, even among highly skilled performers”. 
However, the studies in team sport on WMC reviewed in this thesis do not 
warrant suggesting that WMC is an important limiting basic ability in every 
performance domain. Clearly, the requirements of sports are quite different to those 
of playing chess, the piano, or texas holdem poker and therefore different abilities are 
likely to be important in different domains. Therefore, general theories of expertise 
have to take the specific constraints of the performance situations into account and 
pay careful attention not to over-generalize the implications of specific findings in 
one domain across all domains as the relative influence of basic abilities and domain 
specific knowledge is bound to vary across domains. In the field of sport, research on 
this important topic has just begun and has revealed ambiguous findings. Thus, more 
research is warranted to illuminate the role of basic abilities such as WMC in 
superior sports performance as discussed in the section on limitations and future 
research directions.  
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Practical Implications of the Findings  
The studies reviewed have important applied implications. Especially the 
findings on attentional control in the Chapters 3 and 4 provide a useful theoretical 
framework for deriving practical interventions in sports. In addition I discuss the 
practical implications of the individual differences findings of WMC and sport 
expertise. 
Controlling the attentional focus. Publications II and III demonstrated that 
the current contents of WM—visual objects or verbal instructions—control the focus 
of attention of athletes by inducing an attentional set. This finding in sports has far-
reaching practical implications as it suggests that athletes can “load” their WM 
voluntarily with certain information in order to control their attentional focus. 
Similarly coaches can “load” the WM of athletes and thereby influence their 
attentional focus in a desired manner.  
The experiments showed that attentional guidance from WM can have both 
beneficial and detrimental effects on tactical decision making. On the positive side 
the findings from Publication II show that information held in WM can facilitate 
tactical decision making if it fits the situation—for example if the information in 
WM guides attention towards a certain team-member who is subsequently open and 
therefore passing to him or her would be a sound tactical decision. On the other hand 
our results show that this attentional guidance effect can also have detrimental 
consequences on tactical decision making by directing the attentional focus away 
from important information which can lead to a slow-down in finding a suitable 
tactical solution, as attention has to be redirected. Not only can this effect slow down 
tactical decision making but it can also lead to important information being overseen 
and therefore results in suboptimal decisions. As this effect is particularly 
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pronounced in complex situations team-sport athletes have to be highly careful in 
forming intentions of passing to a certain player as the defense might anticipate a 
pass to this player and there will not be enough time to reorient attention. Instead, 
athletes have to decide appropriately to the situation and not rely on preformed 
intentions, especially in complex situations that include several decision 
opportunities.  
A direct consequence of this finding is that coaches have to be careful about 
giving tactical instructions or announcing “too many” specific offensive plays as it 
can make the decision maker literally blind to more appropriate tactical decisions 
that are not part of the instruction or offensive play (Furley et al., 2010, Appendix III, 
Memmert & Furley, 2007). In many team sports, it is considered state-of-the-art to 
practice precise predetermined offensive plays, especially in American football, 
basketball, handball, and so forth. These offensive routines guide the visual attention 
of the decision maker (e.g., the quarterback). The decision maker has to focus only 
on selected aspects of a specific constellation, because every player has received 
precise instructions on how to behave. Since the decision maker focuses his attention 
accordingly, (s)he has only limited options, often in the form of if–then rules, to 
choose from. Our findings indicate that this method is not always beneficial and 
athletes would often benefit from fewer instructions, leading to more creative 
behavior, which, in turn, would make the athlete less predictable for the opponent. 
Especially when training tactical decision making, it is beneficial to induce a broad 
breadth of attention by giving fewer instructions and not rigidly practicing offensive 
routines (Memmert, 2007). 
Beside the straightforward implications of the attentional control findings 
from WM in Publications II and III the results seem to have even further reaching 
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practical implications. With reference to dual-process theories (Kahneman, 2011) I 
argued that various situations in sport only require System 1 that operates largely 
without controlled attention and that well-learned skill execution is harmed by 
reinvesting attentional control (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock et al., 2004; Gray, 2004). 
Hence, “loading WM” with information that directs attention away from monitoring 
skill execution should have beneficial consequences for executing a well-learned 
skill.  
Such theorizing shows substantial overlap with the pioneering work of 
Timothy Gallway (e.g. 1974/1997) on coaching and the development of personal and 
professional excellence in sport and other fields. Similar to Kahneman (2011) 
Gallway (1974/1997) distinguishes self 1 and self 2, with self 1 being responsible for 
controlled processing and self 2 for automatic processing8
                                                 
8 Exactly opposite to Kahneman’s distinction of System 1 being automatic and System 2 
controlled. 
. Gallway (1974/1997) 
argues in his popular “Inner Game” publications that one has to let self 2 perform the 
actions in sports such as Tennis or Golf in order to be successful, without self 1 
interfering by evaluating every action. Gallway goes on to suggest that self 1 gives 
the instruction to self 2, which performs the action, and gives concrete examples of 
how self 1 can help self 2 to perform the action instead of interfering. For example 
when performing a tennis shot self 1 can give the instruction to watch the rotation of 
the seam on the tennis ball in order to achieve the desired goal of focusing attention 
on the tennis ball and thereby avoiding unwanted conscious monitoring of the shot, 
as research has shown that this kind of external focus of attention is beneficial (Wulf, 
2007 for a review) for smooth skill execution. The attentional guidance findings by 
WM perfectly serve as a theoretical background for deriving these kind of practical 
applications proposed by Gallway (1997).  
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In addition, one might argue that the momentary contents of WM cannot only 
control an athlete’s attentional focus, but that e.g. imagery—a function of the visual-
spatial sketchpad (figure 1) of Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) model—could have a 
kind of training effect on a person’s attentional focus by training an athlete’s 
attentional focus towards task-relevant cues during performance and away from 
irrelevant cues. This argumentation is not new and was first stated by Feltz and 
Landers (1983), who claimed that imagery could facilitate the development of a 
beneficial attentional set during sport performance.  
Another area within sport psychology that might benefit from the WM 
attention link is psychological skill training. Some of the positive effects of self-talk 
strategies, visuo-motor behavior rehearsal, mental practice or goal-setting strategies 
might be attributable to loading WM with beneficial information which in turn helps 
control an athlete’s attentional focus. Therefore, future research should elaborate on 
the WM attention link as it is a promising field for future research in this area. 
Can athletes benefit from WMC training? Based on the individual 
difference findings on WMC and sport expertise I will briefly discuss whether 
athletes might benefit from training their WMC in order to improve their attentional 
control capabilities as advertised by several companies (e.g. 
http://www.cogmed.com/executives-and-athletes; retrieved on 30.08.2012). In view 
of several lines of evidence I would currently not recommend athletes, coaches, or 
sport teams to invest training time and other valuable resources in computer-based 
WMC training.  
First, the studies reviewed in Chapter 5 do not suggest that WMC is a limiting 
factor for successful sport performance and so far studies have only suggested that 
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WM training can be an effective intervention for individuals for whom WMC is a 
limiting factor in everyday life (Klingberg, 2010, for a review).  
Second, presently the evidence for cognitive enhancements through 
computerized WM training is at best mixed, with some studies reporting cognitive 
improvements after computer-based WMC training (Klingberg, 2010) and others not 
(e.g., Owen et al., 2010). Anyway, the more important question concerning the 
present research is not whether performance on cognitive tests can be improved by 
training but whether WM training can improve performance in sports. To date, the 
evidence does not support the notion that training programs advertised to improve 
WMC and in turn everyday attentional control among healthy adults improve 
cognitive functioning beyond the tasks that are actually being trained (Owen et al., 
2010). Similarly, previous endeavors to improve athlete’s performance via 
generalized visual training programs have not proven to be successful (e.g., 
Abernethy & Wood, 2001). Therefore, in consideration of the present evidence on 
WMC training, coaches would probably be better advised to conduct sport-specific 
training to enhance decision making instead of incorporating computer-based WM 
training sessions into their training schedules. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Despite the novel contribution of the findings on WM and attentional control 
in sports the conducted studies are not without their limitations. First, as most of the 
studies were computer based laboratory studies that modelled sport decision making, 
it is not clear whether the findings generalized directly to real world sports 
performance. In both Publication II and III we successively made the experimental 
tasks more representative of sport decision making without the pattern of results 
changing significantly, which is indicative that the results are not a result of the 
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experimental paradigms chosen but generalize to the behavior in question. In this 
respect, we followed a recent call by Meiser (2011; Fiedler, 2011; Simmons, Nelson, 
& Simonsohn, 2011) to increase the external validity of the task, who pointed out the 
necessity of replicating effects found with one set of stimuli with different stimuli to 
ensure that the phenomenon in question applies not only to a certain stimulus set but 
actually generalizes towards the behavior or phenomenon at issue. Nevertheless, 
future research should continue this approach and investigate whether the attentional 
guidance effect is evident in situ on the playing field.  
Similarly, the findings from Publication IV linking WMC to controlled 
attention in sport at this stage do not warrant the conclusion that good decision 
makers—such as quarterbacks in American football or point guards in basketball—
necessarily need to be high on WMC. Even though the current study demonstrated 
that athletes with a high WMC were more successful in focusing their attention and 
resolving response competition in a decision-making task related to their field of 
expertise, it is currently unclear whether this translates to successful decision making 
on the respective sport fields (see Dicks, Button, & Davids, 2010). Therefore, before 
making too “hasty” applied recommendations, it is important to follow up these first 
results in even more representative sport scenarios. In this respect, a combination of 
individual difference approaches concerning WMC with both in situ experimental 
work (Dicks et al., 2010) and field research seem a fruitful avenue for future research 
to scrutinize whether WMC remains predictive of controlled attention in actual 
sporting competition. Only when WMC has proven to be predictive of controlled 
attention in sport competitions might coaches and managers wish to consider using 
WMC measures, for example, for screening, intervention, or even selection purposes. 
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In addition, although WMC was beneficial in specific situations 
representative of sport performance, the capacity of superior attentional control 
might be less beneficial or even detrimental in other sport situations, as research 
from cognitive psychology suggests. For example research indicates that people with 
a high WMC suffer more from performance pressure as they are used to relying on 
this capacity. Under pressure performance worries block the use of WM on which 
high capacity individuals usually rely and in turn their performance suffers in 
comparison to people with a lower WMC (Ashcraft, & Kirk, 2001; Beilock, 2008). 
Further, it seems feasible that athletes with a greater WMC might over-analyze skill 
execution which leads to paralysis by analysis (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 
2001; Masters, 1992) as spare attentional capacity “spills over” to the conscious 
monitoring of skill execution with the intention of circumventing potential 
performance decrements. DeCaro and Beilock (2010) also suggested that learning 
and skill execution might be more associative in nature and less dependent on 
controlled effort for low WMC people. A further aspect of sport performance that 
might suffer from too much attentional control might be creative performance which 
has proven to be an important aspect of team sports (Memmert, 2011). At present, 
ambiguous findings exist on the relationship of WMC and creativity in the cognitive 
literature. While some studies suggest that WMC benefits creative behavior 
(DeDreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012), others suggest that WMC harms 
creative problem solving by focusing too narrowly (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). Taken 
together, all these suggestions can be empirically tested with the approach 
highlighted in Publication IV and future research should address these important 
questions to advance understanding of attentional control and sport performance.  
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Finally, the ambiguous findings on basic information processing capacities of 
athletes in Chapter IV require future research endeavor which is highlighted in the 
next section. 
Implications for future research when studying basic cognitive 
adaptations through sport9
                                                 
9  See Appendix VII and VIII for more detail. 
. First, when attempting to study cognitive adaptations 
through sports, researchers typically utilize a group-contrast paradigm—athletes vs. 
non-athletes; skilled vs. less skilled athletes; experts vs. novices—to test if these 
groups differ on standardized cognitive tests. Group differences on these test scores 
are often then interpreted as evidence for cognitive adaptations due to extended 
practice if these are in favor of the expert group (Nougier, Ripoll, & Stein, 1989; 
Nougier, Stein, & Bonnel, 1991; Nougier & Rossi, 1999; Pesce, Tessitore, Casella, 
Pirritano, & Capranica, 2007; Vestberg et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2010). However, this 
approach does not allow inference of a causal relationship and cannot answer the 
question whether engagement in team sports leads to improvements on cognitive 
ability tests, or whether enhanced cognitive abilities lead people to engage in team 
sports in the first place, increased chances of progressing to better teams, and 
decrease the likelihood of dropping out. Nor would scientists seriously investigate, 
for example, the height of a group of basketball players and non-basketball players 
and infer that basketball players adapted to the constraints of basketball by increasing 
in height. Hence, researchers cannot use the common inter-group paradigm (e.g. 
athletes vs non-athletes) because it does not allow inference of a causal relationship. 
Thus, the only method of studying certain adaptations is an experimental or 
longitudinal design, for example by comparing groups of suitably matched 
participants of which one, for example, engages in a specific soccer training 
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program, the other group engages in physical activity comparable to soccer, and the 
last group acts as control without physical activity. I am not familiar with a single 
study adopting this approach to provide evidence for the broad transfer hypothesis. 
Hence, in this thesis I only address the question—based on my own data and the 
existing literature—whether there is a relationship between general cognitive abilities 
such as WM, attentional control, and superior team sport performance.  
Moreover, it seems necessary that future research should control for several 
other potential confounding variables: (i) that the different groups do not differ in the 
time spent in other activities (e.g., action-video game playing) that might potentially 
cause cognitive adaptations, and (ii) that the different groups do not differ in any 
other state or trait variables that might account for superior performance in test 
situations (e.g., competitiveness). In addition, fitness levels and reaction time need to 
be carefully controlled as these might be confounded with the variables in interest.  
A further problem when interpreting the results from different studies and 
comparing these with one another is the highly diverse range of tasks and paradigms 
utilized in the respective studies. An example illustrative of this problem is the 
differences in the tasks of Vestberg et al. (2012) and the WMC tasks in our studies 
which are both designed to measure executive functions. The results differed 
substantially depending on the task, which is unfortunate because both studies 
attempted to address the question whether successful team sport athletes have 
superior attentional control capacities compared to less successful or non-athletes 
and not whether athletes can perform a specific cognitive test more successfully. For 
this reason it is problematic to compare results from different studies using different 
tasks and paradigms (Memmert & Furley, 2010, Appendix VIII). This problem is 
further amplified if the psychometric properties of the measures used—especially the 
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validity question—are unclear. Hence, currently a lot of the work on the 
sport/cognition relationship is highly paradigm specific and exploratory in its nature 
as two or three groups that differ on some level of their sport experience are 
compared on more or less randomly chosen cognitive tasks. This paradigm-oriented 
research strategy—which prevails in most areas of experimental psychology—is 
problematic in advancing unified theoretical models (Meisner, 2011; Memmert & 
Furley, 2010, Appendix VIII), also in the field of sport expertise. 
Thus, in general, several exciting opportunities and potential topics that merit 
further research remain for those interested in extending current knowledge and 
understanding of the role of WM and controlled attention in the field of sports and 
how these cognitive components relate to the field of sport expertise.  
Concluding Remarks 
Attention research celebrated a renaissance with the advent of World War II 
due to an increased interest in applied questions concerning attention, such as how 
pilots can focus their attention on task relevant information while blocking out 
distractions, how they can divide their attention between controlling levers and 
monitoring several displays, how long radar operators can focus their attention on the 
screen, or whether some people are better at controlling their attention (Boucher, 
2008). Paradoxically, attention research since then has been criticized for having lost 
sight of real world behavior and that some of the most prominent research paradigms 
in the study of attention “run the serious risk of excluding the exploration of 
questions that are crucial to a fuller understanding of human attention and behavior” 
(Kingston et al., 2003, p. 179). Therefore, the present thesis returned to more applied 
research questions on attention by investigating the role of WM in controlling 
attention in the applied field of sports and thereby followed the call of Neisser (1982) 
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who wrote 30 years ago that psychologists should base their research on everyday 
behavior. 
Overall, this thesis has broadened and extended the sports attention and 
expertise literature, having both theoretical and practical implications, and offering 
some promising avenues for future investigations of WM in the area of sports. 
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